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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF UNINTEN-
TIONALLY DEFAULTED CONSTITUTIONAL
CLAIMS
State prisoners whose federal constitutional claims have been
rejected on the merits by state courts generally may seek federal
court review by petitioning a federal district court for a writ of
habeas corpus.' An accused who fails to comply with state pro-
cedural requirements for raising federal constitutional claims may
forfeit the right to raise the claim in the state courts. 2 What effect
such defaults should have on the availability of federal habeas
review has been the subject of a line of Supreme Court cases.
In the 1963 landmark decision Fay v. Noia,3 the Supreme
Court held that procedural defaults of constitutional claims do not
bar habeas review by federal courts.4 Having established the power
I See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). But see Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976) (fourth amendment claims not cognizable on habeas unless state
failed to provide a full and fair opportunity to raise them in the state court).
Federal habeas corpus review of state convictions is authorized by 28 U.S.C.
§2254 (1976).
For historical reviews of the "Great Writ," see Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 H.Anv. L. RIsv. 441, 463-99
(1963); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding,
74 HA~v. L. REv. 1315, 1324-32 (1961).
When unmodified, the term "habeas" in this Comment refers to federal habeas
corpus proceedings.
2For example, if state rules require a defendant to object to illegally seized
evidence at or before the prosecution's attempt to introduce the evidence and if
the state refuses to hear the objection unless it is raised in accordance with those
rules, a defendant who fails to comply with the rule procedurally defaults the
fourth amendment claim.
3372 U.S. 391 (1963).
The respondent, Noia, claimed a coerced confession had been used to convict
him of murder, for which he was serving a life sentence. Noia failed to appeal
his conviction in the state court, but after his co-defendants were successful on
their appeals, Noia sought coram nobis review in the state court. His application
was denied because he had not appealed earlier. On his habeas corpus petition,
the federal district court held that Noia had failed to exhaust the available state
remedies and therefore denied habeas review. The Supreme Court upheld the
reversal by the Second Circuit, finding that Noia's failure to appeal, far from being
deliberate, was a result of his "grisly choice" to avoid the possible imposition of
the death penalty on appeal. Id. 440.
4Id. 428-29. State prisoners whose federal constitutional claims have been
rejected by state courts generally may seek direct review of those claims by the
United States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1976).
Such review is not a matter of right; rather, it is discretionary, see SUP. CT. R. 17,
and only rarely granted. But review by certiorari is never permitted when the
prisoner's conviction is based on an "adequate and independent" state ground. See
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of the federal courts to entertain habeas petitions on procedurally
defaulted claims, the Court went on to hold that procedural de-
faults would bar habeas review whenever the failure to comply
with the state's procedural rule was a "deliberat[e] by-pass[ ]" of
state procedures. 5 A deliberate bypass would bar habeas review
only when it was "the considered choice of the petitioner," 6 not
when it was merely the considered choice of the petitioner's
attorney.7
Fourteen years after Noia, the Court's decision in Wainwright
v. Sykes 8 marked the culmination of a line of cases 9 casting doubt
on the deliberate bypass standard.' 0 The Sykes Court held that
Florida's "contemporaneous-objection rule""1 barred habeas re-
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81; Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207
(1935); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). The prime exam-
ple of a conviction resting on adequate and independent state grounds so as to bar
direct Supreme Court review is one based on procedural defaults.
5 372 U.S. at 438.
6 372 U.S. at 439, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
7 Whether such a bypass had occurred was to be judged according to the
"classic definition of waiver," 372 U.S. at 439, "intentional relinquishment of a
known right or privilege," id., quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
8433 U.S. 72 (1977).
9 In Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), the Court held that the
deliberate bypass standard enunciated in Noia also applied to habeas petitions filed
by federal prisoners. The Court began to reverse the trend four years later in
Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). In Davis, the Court held that a
federal prisoner could not raise on habeas a procedurally defaulted claim of uncon-
stitutional discrimination in the composition of the indicting grand jury absent a
showing of "cause" for failing to comply with the federal rule requiring such claims
to be raised prior to trial. Id. 242. The Davis rule was extended to bar habeas
review for state prisoners in another grand jury challenge, Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536 (1976). The Court held that the state's procedural rule barred
habeas review unless the petitioner showed not only "cause" for the lack of timely
objection, but also "actual prejudice" resulting from the failure to object. Id. 542.
10 For a more complete look at the rise and fall of the deliberate bypass
standard, see Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78
COLUM. L. frav. 1050 (1978); Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: Procedural
Defaults by Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. Rlv. 341 (1978);
Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The
Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1978).
1 1 FLA. R. Cnnvs. P. 3.190(i) required a pretrial motion to suppress an illegally
obtained confession or admission, "but the court in its discretion may entertain the
motion or an appropriate objection at the trial." Id., quoted in Sykes, 433 U.S. at
76 n.5. But see Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 406-07:
[D]esignating the procedure in question as a "contemporaneous-objection
rule" is misleading. The decision whether to object to admission of a
confession is not a split-second determination that counsel is required to
make in the midst of trial by utilizing arcane knowledge possessed only
by members of the legal profession. The Florida statute is typical of state
criminal procedure rules that require motions to suppress confessions to be
made prior to trial and permit the delaying of such objections until the
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view of a Miranda 12 claim not presented to the state trial court
unless the petitioner showed "cause" 13 for the failure to object
and "prejudice" 14 resulting from the procedural default. Such a
rule was required, the Court said, to prevent defense attorneys
from "sandbagging" 15-withholding constitutional claims at trial to
ensure that a new trial could be obtained by resort to habeas in the
event of conviction at the first trial.16 The Court further reasoned
that the marshalling of "[s]ociety's resources" at trial was a "de-
cisive and portentious event" that should not be diminished by the
failure of federal habeas courts to honor contemporaneous-objec-
tion rules.17 This may be classified broadly as a concern for trial
efficiency and finality.'8
The Sykes majority chose not to define either "cause" or
"prejudice"; instead, it held simply that the prisoner had failed
to meet his burden on the issues and left their definition to a later
date.19 The federal courts of appeals have devoted considerable
effort to applying the Sykes test of cause and prejudice.20 Four
years after the Sykes opinion, the courts have yet to resolve an im-
portant question: What showing is necessary for a state prisoner
to satisfy the "cause" requirement for obtaining habeas review of a
procedurally defaulted constitutional claim? 21 This Comment
takes the position that the "cause" requirement should be deemed
satisfied whenever a default is unintentional. This test would dif-
trial only in exceptional circumstances, Therefore, the decision is one
concerning which the attorney has ample opportunity to consult with his
or her client.
Labeling the Florida procedure as a "contemporaneous-objection rule"
is both a reflection of the majority's authoritarian view of the attorney-
client relationship and a means of rendering unnecessary an analysis of
the client's interest in personal participation in the relinquishment of a
constitutional right
(Emphasis in original.)
12 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1967) (statements resulting from
custodial interrogation inadmissible in absence of notice to accused of certain
constitutional rights).
13 433 U.S. at 87.
14 Id. For development of the "cause and prejudice" standard, see supra
note 5.
135 433 U.S. at 89.
16 Id.
17 Id. 90.
18 Id. 88.
' ld. 87.
20 See infra note 51.
21 See infra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
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fer from the Noia deliberate bypass test by requiring the petitioner
to prove that the default was unintentional, instead of forcing the
state to prove that the default was deliberate. 22  Use of an unin-
tentional default standard should alleviate the Sykes majority's
concern with sandbagging. Moreover, such a standard would en-
courage the states to develop procedures increasing trial efficiency
and finality, procedures beyond those available to the federal
courts. This Comment also urges adoption of the unintentional
default standard to avoid automatically penalizing prisoners whose
constitutional claims result from their attorneys' errors. Finally,
the unintentional default standard is presented as a means to fa-
cilitate effective delivery of legal services.
Part I of this Comment explores the Court's opinion in Sykes
and the ways that the courts of appeals have applied Sykes. Part
II criticizes the Sykes Court's conception of why procedural de-
faults occur, poses an alternative analysis, and explores methods
by which states can in fact control procedural defaults. Part III
points to the difficulties in applying the Sykes bar to unintention-
ally defaulted claims and the disadvantages of circumventing that
bar with a sixth amendment ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim. Part
III summarizes by discussing the superiority of the unintentional
default approach to the definition of "cause."
I. Sykes EXAMINED
A. The Opinion
The petitioner in Wainwright v. Sykes 23 was represented by
counsel who ran afoul of Florida's contemporaneous-objection
rule by failing to raise a Miranda objection when the defendant's
post-arrest statement was admitted into evidence. The lower fed-
eral courts found that the deliberate-bypass test did not bar his
habeas petition. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion,24 holding ha-
22 Noia had been interpreted as placing the burden of proof of deliberate bypass
on the state. See United States v. LaVallee, 448 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1971)
(citing cases). See also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 452 (1965), citing
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 438. But see Bonaparte v. Smith, 448 F.2d 385, 386
(5th Cir. 1971). Because Noia does not explicitly declare where the burden rests,
the question at least is open to either interpretation. For a discussion of the clear
shift in burden under Sykes, see Tague, supra note 10, at 34-39.
23 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
2 4 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, Blackmun and Stevens
joined in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Stevens filed concurring opinions. Justice White concurred in the judgment and
wrote separately. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented.
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beas review of Sykes' claims barred, limited what the Court termed
the "dicta" 25 of Fay v. Noia 26 that permitted habeas petitioners,
"absent a 'knowing waiver' or a 'deliberate bypass,' "27 to violate
state contemporaneous-objection rules and still obtain habeas
review.
Discrediting the Noia approach, the Court expressed fear that
Noia "may encourage 'sandbagging' on the part of defense lawyers,
who may take their chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state
trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional claims in a
federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off." 28
Such conduct defeats the aims of rules requiring contemporaneous
objection: finality and orderly administration of state criminal
procedure.
Contemporaneous-objection rules, the Court noted, further
finality and orderly administration in various ways. Strict rules of
procedural default ensure development of a factual record of the
constitutional claim when the witnesses' recollections are freshest,29
allow the "judge who observed the demeanor of the witnesses to
make the factual determinations necessary for properly deciding the
constitutional question," 30 and generally force the prosecution "to
take a hard look at its hole card." 31 Underlying the Court's opin-
ion was a sense that state courts are just as well equipped to process
federal constitutional claims as are the federal courts. Thus,
elimination of the Noia standard would make "the state trial on
the merits the 'main event,' . . . rather than a 'tryout on the road'
for what will later be the determinative federal habeas hearing." 32
The Sykes Court found that the petitioner had shown neither
cause for failing to make the Miranda objection during the state
trial nor resulting prejudice.33  But while holding that petitioner
25 433 U.S. at 87.
20 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
27433 U.S. at 85.
28 Id. 89.
29 Id. 88.
30 Id.
31 Id. 89.
32 Id. 90. But see Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 439 (Court's quest for finality
an attempt "to squeeze the more refined and complex due process issues of the
1970's into a simplistic remedial mechanism that might have been adequate for the
more elementary and readily recognizable due process claims presented in the first
half of the twentieth century").
33 433 U.S. at 91. In holding that the standard had not been satisfied, the
Court noted that the respondent had "advanced no explanation whatever for his
failure to object at trial" and that the evidence of guilt other than the challenged
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Sykes would be denied habeas review, the Court declined to define
precisely the "cause and prejudice" test.3 4 Justice Rehnquist sim-
ply described the standard as "narrower" 35 than the Fay v. Noia
test; he also expressed confidence "that the rule will not prevent a
federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the federal
constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an
adjudication will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice." 36
The "cause and prejudice" rule resulting from Sykes was a
response to the concerns of finality and orderly administration and
was in reaction to what the Court perceived to be the overly broad
sweep of Noia. Under Noia, in the Court's view, not only could
attorneys "sandbag," 37 but the "refusal of federal habeas courts
to honor contemporaneous-objection rules may also [have made]
state courts themselves less stringent in their enforcement [of
orderly administrative rules]." 88
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's
opinion.39 Chief Justice Burger wrote separately to emphasize his
view that Noia "was never designed for, and is inapplicable to,
errors . . . alleged to have been committed during trial." 40 The
Chief Justice then distinguished between decisions made by the
defendant and those that are left to counsel. Those decisions
made by the defendant include "whether to plead guilty, waive a
jury, or testify in one's own behalf"; 4:1 the attorney's decisions are
those involving the "day-to-day conduct of the defense." 42 The
Fay v. Noia-Johnson v. Zerbst 43 "knowing and intelligent waiver
confession "was substantial to a degree that would negate any possibility of actual
prejudice resulting to the respondent from the admission of his inculpatory state-
ment." Id. (footnote omitted).
4 Id. 87.
35 Id.
3G Id. 91.
37 Id. 89.
38 Id. The Court has acknowledged that trial participants may also believe
"that there may be no need to adhere to those [constitutional] safeguards during
the trial itself." Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct 1558, 1571 (1982).
39 See supra note 24.
40 433 U.S. at 92 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
41Id. 83 n.1, citing STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTIoN FUNCTION
Am DEFENSE: FuNcTioN § 5.2, at 237-38 (App. Draft 1971) Ehereinafter cited
as ABA STANDA.RDS].
42433 U.S. at 93 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (attorney has immediate and
ultimate responsibility "of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any,
to call, and what defenses to develop.").
43304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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standard," 44 the Chief Justice argued, is inappropriate for trial
decisions resting solely with the defense attorney.45 Presumably,
therefore, the "core holding" 46 of Noia would continue to be
viable only for those few decisions that are left to the accused.
Justice Stevens added that the "cause and prejudice" standard
seemed consistent with what the lower federal courts already had
been doing.
47
Agreeing that Sykes had the burden of proving no deliberate
bypass and of explaining why he did not object, Justice White
concurred in the judgment only,48 urging the Court to develop a
harmless-error rule of actual prejudice. In his view, requiring
the state to show harmless error, in light of a constitutional viola-
tion, would adequately protect the state's interests. As to cause,
Justice White was satisfied with the deliberate bypass rule, with the
caveat that for bypass to occur the accused need not always agree
with counsel's decision.49 He was thus in agreement with the Chief
Justice and Justice Stevens in objecting to the Noia rule that peti-
tioners be barred from habeas review only for defaults that were
their own "considered choice." 50
B. "Cause" in the Lower Federal Courts
Wainwright v. Sykes has been discussed extensively by the
federal courts of appeals. 51 In possible efforts to avoid the un-
charted seas of "cause and prejudice," 52 however, the courts of ap-
peals frequently have rejected petitions on the merits rather than
address the threshold test.53 Other courts have avoided confronta-
44 Noia looked to Zerbst in developing its deliberate bypass standard. See
supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
45 433 U.S. at 93 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
46 Id. 94.
471d. (Stevens, J., concurring).
48 Id. 97 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
49 Id. 98-99.
5 0 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
51 The case bad been cited in over 130 published court of appeals opinions by
September 1, 1981. See also Tague, supra note 10, at 21-22 (if Sykes court had
hoped to decrease the federal burden associated with habeas review, an undefined
threshold test was not a wise choice).
52 See supra text accompanying note 34.
53 See, e.g., Williams v. Smith, 591 F.2d 169, 173 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979); Bryan v. Wainwright, 588 F.2d 1108, 1110 (5th
Cir. 1979); Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1978);
Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 591-92 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 976 (1979); King v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 435, 437 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
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tion by applying the Sykes bar without even mentioning the "cause
and prejudice" exception.
54
Relying on Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in
Sykes, most courts discussing the "cause and prejudice" standard 55
denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979). See also Gale v. Harris, 580 F.2d 52, 53 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (court rejects petition on merits rather than deciding
whether Sykes or Fay test applies), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 965 (1979).
54 See, e.g., Katz v. King, 627 F.2d 568, 577 (1st Cir. 1980); Gore v. Leeke,
605 F.2cd 741, 743 (4th Cir. 1979) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1087 (1980); United States v. Anderson, 577 F.2d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam); United States v. Eldridge, 569 F.2d 319, 320 (5th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 929 (1978); Loud v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1326, 1329-30 (5th
Cir. 1977); Nichols v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1330, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1020 (1978).
55 Much discussion has been devoted to the other circumstances necessary
before the "cause and prejudice" test comes into play: Courts have found the test
inapplicable when failure to object at trial does not violate a procedural nile or
result in default of state remedies, see, e.g., Washington v. Harris, 650 F.2d 447,
451 (2d Cir. 1981); Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1148 (5th Cir. 1981);
Henson v. Wyrick, 634 F.2d 1080, 1081 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
1417 (1981); Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1980); Freeman v.
Georgia, 599 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980);
Zapata v. Estelle, 588 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1979); Tully v. Scheu, 607 F.2d
31, 33 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 301 (1981); Brinlee v. Crisp, 608
F.2d 839, 857 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980); Rummel v.
Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), af'd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980);
Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F.2d 618, 626 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
929 (1979); Codispoti v. Howard, 589 F.2d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 1978); when a
state court reaches the merits of petitioner's allegedly defaulted claim, see, e.g.,
Thompson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 996, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1981); Braxton v. Estelle,
641 F.2d 392, 394-97 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Gruttola v. Hammock, 639
F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1981); Hockenbury v. Sowders, 633 F.2d 443, 444-45 (6th
Cir. 1980) (denying petition for rehearing en bane), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933
(1981); Mitchell v. Smith, 633 F.2d 1009, 1011 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1088 (1981); Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605, 617 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1028 (1981); Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 531, 533 (5th
Cir. 1980); Clark v. Blackburn, 632 F.2d 531, 533 (5th Cir. 1980); Soap v. Carter,
632 F.2d 872, 876 (10th Cir. 1980); Alburquerque v. Bara, 628 F.2d 767, 768
(2d Cir. 1980); Thomas v. Blackburn, 623 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 953 (1981); Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 112 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981); Baker v. Muncy, 619 F.2d 327,
329 (4th Cir. 1980); Babers v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 178, 179 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 985 (1980); Cook v. Bordenkircher, 602 F.2d 117, 119 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936 (1980); Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th
Cir. 1979); Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297, 1301 (5th Cir. 1979); Cannon v.
Alabama, 558 F.2d 1211, 1216 n.12 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087
(1978); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 267 n.7 (1980); County Court
of Ulster Go., N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 148 (1979); a difficult inquiry in its
own right, see, e.g., Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1980); Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294, 1296 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1979); Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1978); Collins
v. Auger, 577 F.2d 1107, 1108-10 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133
(1979); and when the state neglects to assert the Sykes bar in federal court, see
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234 (1980); Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694,
701 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Wynn v. Mahoney, 600 F.2d
448, 450 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1980).
Courts have also debated what constitutes a sufficient objection to preclude
use of the Sykes bar. See Mayola v. Alabama, 633 F.2d 992, 995 (5th Cir. 1980);
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have held the Sykes test to have displaced the Noia deliberate by-
pass test for defaults resulting from decisions that ultimately rest
with defense counsel rather than the accused. 8 Thus,- the Sykes
test is applied to all issues other than whether the defendant
should testify, plead guilty, or waive a jury trial.
57
Those courts that actually have attempted to define the type
of attorney conduct that will satisfy "cause" 58 have reached vary-
Thomas v. Estelle, 582 F.2d 939, 940 (5th Cir. 1978); Suggs v. LaVallee, 570
F.2d 1092, 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978). The extent to
which a state court's determination concerning the adequacy of the objection as a
matter of state law is to be accepted as determinative of the Sykes question remains
unclear. One court has found Sykes inapplicable when a state's rule is too "harsh."
See Cheeck v. Bates, 615 F.2d 559, 562 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 944
(1980). Some judges would confine the Sykes rule to instances in which an objec-
tion is necessary to build a complete record surrounding the constitutional claim.
See Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1981) (Logan, J., dissenting);
Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055, 1069 (4th Cir.) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). Still others would require trial judges not
to permit certain procedural defaults to occur. See United States' v. Powe, 591
F.2d 833, 843 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Also unanswered is whether a defendant's
objection prevents the Sykes bar from operating against a non-objecting co-defend-
ant. See Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 337-(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 966 (1979).
There is also disagreement whether Sykes applies to procedurally defaulted
fourth amendment claims, see United States ex rel. Maxey v. Morris, 591 F.2d 386,
391 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 912 (1979); Johnson v. Meacham, 570 F.2d
918, 920 (10th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 836-40
(2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978), and whether Sykes
bars review in the case of "plain error," see Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359 (10th
Cir. 1981); Hockenbury v. Sowders, 633 F.2d 443, 444 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981); Brewer v. Overberg, 624 F.2d 51, 53 (6th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1085 (1981); Krzeminski v. Perini, 614 F.2d
121, 123 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 866 (1980); Cook v. Bordenkircher,
602 F.2d 117, 119 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936 (1980); Rachel v.
Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1978); Carr v. Alabama, 586 F.2d 462, 465
(5th Cir. 1978); Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515, 519-24 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1979); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 99 (White,
J., concurring in the judgment).
56See Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1981); Myers v.
Washington, 646 F.2d 355, 357-59 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 1964
(1982); Crick v. Smith, 650 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1281 (1982); Graham v. Mabry, 645 F.2d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 1981); Guzzardo v.
Bengston, 643 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981);
Wright v. Bombard, 638 F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 935 (1981); Grace v. Butterworth, 635 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981); Rodgers v. Wyrick, 621 F,2d 921, 927 (8th Cir.
1980); Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981); Boyer v. Patton, 579 F.2d 921, 927 (8th Cir. 1980); Harris v.
Spears, 606 F.2d 639, 641-42 (5th Cir. 1979); Ferguson v. Boyd, 566 F.2d 873,
879 (4th Cir. 1977). See also Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 397 n.251.
5 7 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
58 Most courts require a showing of "cause" and "prejudice," see, e.g., Graham
v. Mabry, 645 F.2d 603, 608 n.3 (8th Cir. 1981); Tyler v. Phelps, 643 F.2d 1095,
1100 (5th Cir. 1981); Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 112, on rehearing,
633 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981); Jurek v. Estelle,
1982]
990 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ing results. Some courts have attempted to give content to the
term by referring to the Sykes concern 59 for avoiding a "miscar-
riage of justice"; 60 but those same courts have given little hint
as to what "miscarriage of justice" means.61 One court 62 has said
that a habeas petitioner must show that his attorney's failure to
object amounted to "incompetence" in order to satisfy the "cause"
prong. 3 Although sixth amendment ineffectiveness of counsel has
been held to satisfy the "cause" prong, courts finding such ineffec-
tiveness have not discussed what else will satisfy "cause." "
"Cause" has been held satisfied in other situations. In Collins
v. Auger, 5 the Eighth Circuit stated that an attorney's lack of
knowledge of the facts or law underlying a claim satisfies Sykes
cause, 6 but never defined the ambiguous "lack of knowledge of
593 F.2d 672, 681 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981), but some
courts have suggested that a showing of either cause or prejudice may suffice, see
Thomas v. Estelle, 587 F.2d at 698; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 95
(Stevens, J., concurring); Sumner v. Mata, 439 U.S. 112 (1980) (cause or prejudice
in dictum). Other courts accomplish essentially the same end by employing a
standard of "cause" that varies according to the extent of the prejudice shown. See
Huffman v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Smith
v. Estelle, 602 F.2d at 701 n.8; see also Goodman & Sallet, Wainwright v. Sykes:
The Lower Federal Courts Respond, 30 HASTns L.J. 1683, 1725 (1979). But see
Tyler v. Phelps, 643 F.2d 1095, 1101 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981) ("cause" and "prejudice"
independent).
59 See supra text accompanying note 36.
'OSee Huffman v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347, 348 (5th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (citing Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 880 (5th Cir. 1978));
Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1977)); Harris v. Spears, 606
F.2d at 641-42.
61 "Miscarriage of justice" is not undefinable: The Court revealed a good deal
about its sense of justice in Stone v. Powell, 482 U.S. 465 (1975) (habeas review
generally not available for fourth amendment claims). The Court stated that "the
disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police officer and
the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to
the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice." Id. 490
(footnote omitted). See infra note 167.
62590 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
03 Id. 155.
84 See United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981); Binehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 130 n.6 (8th Cir.
1977).
Commentators have warned that the Supreme Court may be plagued with
these issues in coming years-as petitioners increasingly use ineffectiveness com-
plaints to avoid the Sykes bar of claims their attorneys have defaulted. See
Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 418-47; Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 19 Amuz. L. REv. 443, 476-84 (1977); Tague,
supra note 10, at 56-66. The Court, therefore, may be forced to define the ineffec-
tiveness standard, a task it has yet to confront, see infra note 169 and accompanying
text.
65577 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133 (1979).
66 577 F.2d at 1110 & n.2.
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the law." 67 Courts similarly have held that defaults caused by
"inadvertent mistake or neglect or the press of -circumstance"
satisfy cause, 68 and have found that "ignorance" of a "significant
constitutional right" is sufficiently "serious" to justify habeas re-
view.69 The one clear point in this area is that the burden of
proving "cause," 70 as well as "prejudice," 71 has been placed
squarely on the shoulders of habeas petitioners. Substantial agree-
ment as to what satisfies "cause," however, is lacking. The lower
federal courts appear at odds as to how best to further the state's
interests, as expressed in Sykes, while still protecting the petitioners'.
II. WHAT Sykes CONCEALS: STATE CONTROL OF FiNALiTY
A. The State's Finality Interest
Federal habeas review of either procedurally defaulted con-
stitutional claims or claims considered and rejected on their merits
inevitably conflicts with the state's interest in finality.72 The state,
of course, will always bear the initial cost of opposing habeas
petitions. Even greater than this cost, however, is the cost the
state bears if the petition is granted. The state must bear the
cost of retrial: the cost of prosecution, the cost of providing the
forum, and often the cost of defense. The burden of jury service
falls on state residents. In addition to the financial burden, re-
trial disrupts state rehabilitative efforts. 73 Federal habeas review
67 For discussion of a problem analogous to defining an attorney's "lack of
knowledge of the law," see infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (description
of an "unintentional bypass").
68 Harris v. Spears, 606 F.2d at 643.
69 See Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d at 683.
70 See, e.g., Graham v. Mabry, 645 F.2d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 1981); Mendiola
v. Estelle, 635 F.2d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Frazier v. Jago, 652
F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1981); Jacks v. Duckworth, 651 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1010 (1982); Wright v. Bombard, 638 F.2d 457, 459 (2d
Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied 450 U.S. 935 (1981); Soap v. Carter, 632
F.2d 872, 876 (1oth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981); Pharr v. Israel,
629 F.2d 1278, 1280 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1088 (1981); Kemph
v. Estelle, 621 F.2d 163, 163 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1000 (1981); Meyer v. Estelle, 621 F.2d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 1980); Conquest
v. Mitchell, 618 F.2d 1053, 1054-56 (4th Cir. 1980); Parton v. Wyrick, 614 F.2d
154, 157 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 846 (1980); Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597
F.2d 474, 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1980); Lewis v. Cardwell,
609 F.2d 926, 927 (9th Cir. 1979); Buckalew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515, 520
(5th Cir. 1978); Crowell v. Zahadnick, 571 F.2d 1257, 1258 (4th Cir. 1977).
71 See, e.g., Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597 F.2d at 476.
7 2 See Bator, supra note 1, at 444-53; Tague, supra note 10, at 54 n.26.
73 Whether the mere possibility of retrial disrupts the rehabilitative process is
disputed. Compare Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262-63 (1973)
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also interferes with the state's system of orderly administration of
justice; in Wainwright v. Sykes the Court suggested that states
lose the incentive to enforce procedural rules when defaulted
claims can be reviewed on habeas.74  Thus finality is a legitimate
concern of states7
5
B. The Sykes Court and the Finality Interest
1. What Sykes Can't Do
The restrictive review approach to increasing the finality of state
convictions-defining "cause" such that some or all unintentionally
defaulted claims are not directly cognizable "I on habeas-has no im-
pact on claims actually raised and rejected in the state courts; these
remain directly cognizable on habeas.77 Nor would denying re-
view of unintentionally defaulted claims increase the finality of state
convictions by decreasing the number of frivolous habeas petitions.
Although the state would assert the Sykes bar rather than argue the
merits, any benefit to the state may be more apparent than real
because the prisoner may file a habeas petition maintaining that
counsel's default amounted to sixth amendment ineffectiveness, 71
thus avoiding the Sykes bar. This "end-run" around Sykes may
require the state to argue the merits of the procedurally defaulted
claim on habeas because the validity of the claim may be relevant
to whether failure to assert it constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.7 9
(Powell, J., concurring) (possibility of retrial disrupts focus on rehabilitation) with
Freund, Symposium on Habeas Corpus, 9 UTAH L. Rlv. 27, 30 (1964) (availability
of collateral relief is a wholesome form of therapy).
74433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977).
75 See Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAIIv. L. REv.
1, 17-18 (1956). Schaefer, a Justice on the Supreme Court of Illinois, recognized
three areas having federalism implications: the "flood" of frivolous habeas petitions,
the "unseemliness" of a district court judge reviewing the decision of the highest
state court, and the undue interference of habeas with the administration of criminal
law.
76 To the extent that the unintentionally defaulted claim remains relevant in a
habeas proceeding based on an ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim, the unintentionally
defaulted claim is cognizable in an indirect manner.
77The Sykes bar to habeas review applies only to procedurally defaulted
claims. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
78 See Tague, supra note 10, at 60-66; Strazzella, supra note 64, at 472-73.
79 See Tague, supra note 10, at 62-64 (the Supreme Court is likely to add a
requirement that the attorney's error actually prejudice the defendant). Compare
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (post-conviction court should not
review merits of the defaulted claim).
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2. What Sykes Doesn't Do-
In focusing on denial of habeas, review of procedurally
defaulted claims as a way to foster finality of state criminal convic-
tions,80 the Sykes Court failed to develop its assumption that at-
torneys generally act deliberately.81 If one accepts that assump-
tion, denying habeas review for procedurally defaiulted claims
would foster finality by decreasing the number of procedural
defaults that occur at trial.82 In the majority of cases, however,
procedural default is not deliberate; 13 elimination of habeas re-
view of procedurally defaulted claims thus would deter procedural
defaults only to the extent that attorneys would be more careful.
This, of course, may decrease defaults somewhat-but at great cost
to the unfortunate petitioner whose attorney will not, or cannot,
use great care. Thus, the cost of increased finality is borne ran-
domly by a few unlucky prisoners. 8
In attempting to define "cause," the federal courts of appeals
have not recognized that most procedural defaults are not de-
liberate,s but rather have accepted the Sykes assumption. If
the courts had recognized why procedural defaults actually occur,
they would have seen the ways states themselves can increase
finality in a manner similar to that which the Sykes Court con-
templated-by decreasing the number of procedural defaults at the
state trial level.
80 See supra notes 23-50 and accompanying text.
81 See infra notes 86-98.
82 Even if the number of procedural defaults decreases, state finality will be
upset if the state fails to resolve the constitutional claim in the same way that the
federal system would because habeas review generally remains available for fully
litigated claims. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Thus the Sykes court
appears interested primarily in ensuring that the state get the first shot at consti-
tutional claims that may upset the state's finality interest.
8 3 See infra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
s4 Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 113 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[u]nplanned and unintentional action of any kind generally is not subject to
deterrence; and, to the extent that it is hoped that a threatened sanction addressed
to the defense will induce greater care and caution on the part of trial lawyers,
thereby forestalling negligent conduct or error, the potential loss of all valuable
state remedies would be sufficient to this end.") (footnote omitted); The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term, 91 HAnv. L. REv. 70, 218 (1977); Rosenberg, supra note 10,
at 415-16. Because a number of procedural defaults are caused by attorneys
spending too little time per case, see infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text
some defaults can be deterred as long as an attorney is willing to increase the
length of time he works. It seems unlikely, however, that a sanction applied to
the client will motivate an attorney, in essence, to reduce his own standard of living.
Sanctions applied directly to the attorney, however, may have an impact. See infra
note 142 and accompanying text.
85 See infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
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C. Myth and Reality: How Attorneys Operate
That the federal courts of appeals have failed to produce a
reasoned definition of the "cause" prong of the Wainwright v.
Sykes test is not surprising. In Sykes the Supreme Court focused
on the phenomenon of "sandbagging," but did not explore the
more likely reasons for procedural defaults. The courts of appeals
have followed the Supreme Court's lead in assuming that attorneys
default claims, on the whole, deliberately.
1. Where Sykes Goes Wrong
The Sykes majority believed that the deliberate bypass rule of
Fay v. Noia 8 encouraged defense lawyers to withhold federal con-
stitutional claims and "take their chances on a verdict of not
guilty in a state trial court with the intent to raise their constitu-
tional claims in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble does
not pay off." 87 Since the Sykes decision, scholars have pointed
out that practical considerations suggest that this phenomenon-
"sandbagging" 8-occurs infrequently.8 9
A defendant who fails to raise a constitutional claim is sub-
ject to a number of sanctions other than denial of habeas corpus
review, and thus has reason to hesitate before defaulting. The
bypass of state procedural rules may prevent the defendant from
raising a claim in the state appellate courts.90 To assume that the
loss of such state appellate remedies fails to deter sandbagging
suggests that defendants and their attorneys believe that the states,
as a rule, do not adequately protect constitutional claims through
their criminal appeals systems, a suggestion the Court has rejected
in the context of fourth amendment claims.91  Even if defendants
86 372 U.S. 91 (1963).
87433 U.S. at 89.
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., Tague, supra note 10, at 43-46.
90 Indeed, unless the bypass does result in default of state remedies, the Sykes
rule does not bar habeas review. See supra note 55.
91 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976):
Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic atti-
tude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years past,
we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appro-
priate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts
of the several States. State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional
obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law.
(citation omitted).
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or their attorneys decide to bypass certain claims, exhaustion-of-
state-remedies requirements 92 may result in a lengthy period of
incarceration before the deliberately bypassed constitutional claim
can be raised in the federal forum. And when early release is
possible through the operation of state processes,9 3 availability of
federal habeas relief would seem to be little incentive for sand-
bagging.9-
4
Even in the rare instance when the defense believes its case
is bolstered by allowing a constitutional violation to go unad-
dressed, 95 the defense would nonetheless benefit by raising the
claim itself, thereby preventing the prosecution from introducing
the evidence: "introduction by the prosecution as part of the state's
case almost inevitably imprints on the minds of the jurors the
notion that the confession [or evidence generally is] incriminating
since, otherwise, the prosecution would presumably not have used
it." 96 The defendant thus may lose a tactical advantage by failing
to raise his claim. Additionally, the often-cited reason for failing
to object at trial-fear that an objection will make the evidence
appear more damaging than it otherwise would 97-has no ap-
plicability in many situations because of the availability of pre-
trial proceedings and motions in limine. Even when suppression
of the fruits of a constitutional violation seems unimportant in
itself, resort to pretrial proceedings permits the defense to engage
in a limited form of pretrial discovery. 98 In the end, the defend-
ant has more to lose from a default than the Sykes Court took
into account.
92 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1976).
93The median time for disposition of a state habeas petition in federal district
court is two months, see Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 423 n.341, but even if the
petition is granted, the prisoner may be required to remain in prison pending
disposition of the state's appeal of the district court ruling.
94For example, in Isaac v. Engle, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982), two of the three
habeas petitioners whose cases were consolidated on certiorari had been granted
parole and subsequently received final releases prior to appeal of their cases. See
Brief for Petitioner at 8-9.
95 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., concurring) (state-
ment allegedly obtained in violation of Miranda rule was consistent in many respects
with accused's trial testimony and "had some positive value, since it portrayed the
[accused] as having acted in response to provocation, which might have influenced
the jury to return a verdict on a lesser charge.").
96 Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 404.
97 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 97 (Stevens, J., concurring).
98 See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 403. See also F. BAnLny & H. RoTnmLArr,
INVESTICATION AND PBEPAA-TION OF CnmNAL CAsEs §§ 324, 352 (1970).
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2. How Procedural Defaults Really Happen
Because of the practical disadvantages of "sandbagging," 99 a
defense attorney will rarely commit deliberate bypass in the true
sense 100-that is, intentionally relinquishing one of the defendant's
known rights or privileges. 1°1 Rather, most procedural bypasses
are probably unintentional.
One type of default is caused by the attorney's lack of infor-
mation; the attorney simply may be unaware of the factual basis
of a potential claim. On the other hand, the attorney could be
fully aware of the factual (and the legal) bases of a constitutional
claim but default it through ignorance of the procedural require-
ments for preserving it. Still another mistake would occur if the
attorney knew the facts, but erroneously concluded that they had
no bearing on the case. Such decisions often result from a lack
of time to prepare a case fully.
Time pressures probably are felt strongest by those attorneys
representing indigents. 10 2  Typically, those attorneys are with a
public defender's office 103 or are private attorneys working through
legal aid societies or a court-appointment system. 1°4 Regardless of
whether an attorney is public or private, inadequate compensation
for representing indigents impedes effective representation.
99 See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
100 When it is committed, however, the test proposed by this Comment would
bar habeas review because the petitioner would carry the burden of disproving de-
liberate bypass. To the extent that sandbagging is likely, then, the proposed test
would discourage it.
01 Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (defining waiver as "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"). The
Noia Court suggested that a deliberate bypass could occur only when the decision
to relinquish the right was made by the accused. See supra text accompanying note
6. But the Sykes Court rejected that approach, see supra text accompanying notes
24-27, apparently giving defense counsel the power to bind the accused on the basis
of counsel's deliberate bypass.
102 Over 60 percent of the defendants who had public defenders reported in a
recent study that their attorney had spent less than one-half hour with them; almost
30 percent put the figure at less than ten minutes. See J. CASPER, CRIMINAL
CoURTs: TnE DEFENDANT's PERSPECTIVE iv (1978) (abstract), reprinted in
Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 90 (5th ed.
1980). See also Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J.
811, 817-18 (1976) (attorney indifference and overwork "most frequent" causes of
ineffective representation).
103 A public defender's office is "headed by a public official and supported by
public funds." Friloux, Equal Justice Under the Law: A Myth, Not a Reality, 12
AM. Caim. L. REv. 691, 695 (1975) (footnote omitted). See generally, Wice &
Suwak, Current Realities of Public Defender Programs: A National Survey and
Analysis, 10 Cim. L. BuLL. 161 (1974).
10 4 See J. CAsPER, AMERucAN CRIMNAL JUsTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S IPERSPEC-
TwVE 102 (1972); see also Friloux, supra note 103, at 695.
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In the private system, for example, attorneys serving in court
appointments earn far less than they would billing private clients.
This economic disincentive forces attorneys to minimize time spent
on court appointments. 10 5 Attorneys whose practices consist al-
most exclusively of court appointments at relatively low hourly
rates must increase their work week to keep pace with their peers;
the resultant overwork may lessen the attorneys' effectiveness.1' 6
In addition to the general problem of low reimbursement, court
appointments may use reimbursement schemes that dissuade thor-
ough factual and legal research by rewarding attorneys who spend
a high percentage of their time in the courtroom: as Judge Baze-
lon has noted,1'07 the federal Criminal Justice Act discourages full
preparation of cases not only by reimbursing attorneys at a low
rate, but also by reimbursing them at a lower rate for out-of-
court work than for courtroom duty. 08
The better-known public defender system has received some
academic attention in the wake of Argersinger v. Hamlin,0 9 in
which the Supreme Court extended the Gideon v. Wainwright 110
guarantee of legal counsel to misdemeanants."n This attention
has done nothing to alleviate the severe economic pressure on the
system. Commentators point to inadequate funding as one of the
public defender system's greatest weaknesses." 2  Because of limited
funding, many public defender's offices are understaffed; the result-
ing caseloads are often unmanageable. 113  Further, little time is
105 In Connecticut, where court-appointed attorneys are paid $12.50 per hour,
one attorney estimated that representing an indigent murder suspect cost the attorney
$20,000 in potential earnings and forced him "to give up his solo practice and join
a firm." Bar Talk: A Going Rate of $12.50/Hr., Ar. LAw., Oct. 1981, at 16. The
attorney, who spent 500 hours on the case, including a ten-week trial, plans to
withdraw from representing the indigent suspect in the new trial the attorney won
by showing that one of the jurors in the first trial had intentionally withheld infor-
mation during voir dire. Id.
'
0 6 See Bazelon, supra note 102, at 817-18.
107 United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 279 n.80 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en
banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
108 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1) (1976). Under the Act, court-appointed attor-
neys receive a mximum of $30 per hour for courtroom time and $20 per hour for
out-of-court time.
109 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
110 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"' See generally Friloux, supra note 103, at 700-01; Wice & Suwak, supra
note 103, at 183.
112 See Friloux, supra note 103, at 700-01; Wice & Suwak, supra note 103, at
182-83.
113 See Bazelon, supra note 102, at 815; J. CAsPER, supra note 104, at 103.
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available to interview the client to learn fully the facts of his
case." 4 Lower salaries mean less recruiting power at law schools;
at the very least young lawyers choosing to work as public de-
fenders usually remain in the system for only a short period of
time after graduation. The staff in many offices is therefore in-
experienced."8  Few training and continuing education programs
are offered to help alleviate the situation." 6
3. Blinders on the Deaf: An Example of the Courts'
Acceptance of Sykes
Despite the protestations of scholars," 7 the federal courts of ap-
peals have ignored the most likely reasons that procedural defaults
occur,"" relying instead on the Sykes assumption that attorneys
almost always act deliberately. The result is two-fold: First, be-
cause the courts do not acknowledge the other reasons procedural
defaults occur, they never consider how their definitions of "cause"
actually affect the frequency of procedural default. 19  Second,
much of the discussion focuses on inaccurate assumptions about
the effects resulting from a particular definition of "cause." Courts
assume, for example, that one definition will deter certain unde-
sirable attorney behavior.
The debate in the change-of-law cases 120 illustrates the ways
courts reason. The change-of-law cases involve procedural de-
faults that occur prior to an event-such as a United States Su-
114 See Bazelon, supra note 102, at 815.
115 See Bazelon, supra note 102, at 815; Wice & Suwak, supra note 103, at 165.
116 See Bazelon, supra note 102, at 815, citing Wice & Pilgrim, Meeting the
Gideon Mandate: A Survey of Public Defender Programs, 58 JUmIcATtRE 400, 402
(1975); Wice & Suwak, supra note 103, at 165.
117 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 403-05; Tague, supra note 10, at
43-46.
118 See supra text accompanying notes 99-116.
119 See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
120 Compare Myers v. Wash., 646 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct.
1964 (1982); Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct.
1558 (1982); Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980); Bell v. Perini,
636 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982); United States v.
Frady, 636 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1584 (1982), in all of
which habeas was granted, with Taylor v. Harris, 640 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 942 (1981); Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980); Carter v. Jago, 637 F.2d 449 (6th Cir.
1980); Lewis v. Cardwell, 609 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1979); Frazier v. Weatherholtz,
572 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978), in all of which habeas
was denied.
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preme Court decision-making clear that the defaulted claim was
indeed valid. The question is whether the "cause" prong of
Sykes is satisfied in such a case.121 An example reveals the char-
acter of the courts' analysis of the "cause" issue. In Myers v.
Washington, 22 defense counsel failed to object at trial to jury
instructions that shifted the burden of proof of self-defense from
the state to the accused. At that time, the Supreme Court had not
made a definitive ruling on the issue. After the procedural de-
fault occurred, the Supreme Court held in Mullaney v. Wilbur123
that such burden-shifting jury instructions violate the accused's
due process rights. The Myers court divided on whether the fail-
ure to anticipate the Mullaney ruling satisfied the cause prong of
Sykes; the majority found the unsettled state of the law sufficient
to satisfy "cause" and permitted habeas review. The majority
permitted habeas review in the change-of-law circumstance be-
cause to have done otherwise would "simply encourage defense
attorneys to raise on appeal every conceivable constitutional chal-
lenge that might some day be accepted-and thus overload their
briefs with unmeritorious issues." 124 The majority assumed its
holding would limit such challenges. The dissent argued that the
majority's rule removes the attorney's incentive to foster legal evo-
121 The Supreme Court recently answered this question in the negative. See
Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982). Despite the allegations of the habeas
petitioners that they "could not know that Ohio's self-defense instructions raised
constitutional questions," the Court found that the possible claims "were far from
unknown at the time of their trials." Id. 1573. Thus the "cause" prong was not
satisfied. Stressing the special concerns associated with habeas review, Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, said:
[Tihe Constitution guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and
a competent attorney. It does not insure that defense counsel will recog-
nize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim. Where the basis of
a constitutional claim is available, and other defense counsel have perceived
and litigated that claim, the demands of comity and finality counsel against
labelling alleged unawareness of the objection as cause for a procedural
default.
Id. 1573-74. How many "other defense counser' must "perceive and litigatef]"
the claim is uncertain.
Emphasizing that "[Tih[e] claim did not exist at any time during Isaac's trial
or direct appeal," id. 1579, Justice Brennan penned a scathing dissent:
I hope that the Court forgets only momentarily that "the States' sovereign
power" is limited by the Constitution of the United States: that the "in-
trusion" complained of is the supreme law of the land. But it must be
reason for deep concern when this Court forgets, as it certainly does today,
that "it is a constitution we are expounding, ....
Id. 1582, citing M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
122 646 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 194 (1982).
123 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
124 646 F.2d at 360.
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lution through presentation of innovative claims. By removing
the penalty of lost habeas review for procedural defaults of un-
established claims, the dissent posited, the court encourages at-
torneys to rely on "mere rote recitations of hornbook legal prin-
ciples." 16 This Comment challenges the assumption, made by
both sides, that the new rule would affect attorney behavior.126
D. The State's Control
Analysis of how procedural defaults actually occur reveals that
the states can, if they so desire, 27 decrease procedural defaults-
and thus increase finality-in ways unavailable to the federal
courts. 28  Increased funding of public defender's offices would
ease heavy caseloads,129 and higher rates of reimbursement for
court-appointed attorneys, as well as revision of pay scales that dis-
courage thorough investigation of the legal and factual bases of
potential claims, would encourage attorneys with private practices
not to slight their court-appointed cases, 130 lessen the workload of
attorneys whose practices consist almost exclusively of court ap-
pointments, 13' and encourage out-of-court preparation by court-
appointed attorneys.132  Increasing the time court-appointed coun-
sel can spend with a client would likely lessen the client's mistrust
of the attorney, facilitating investigation of the factual bases of
potential claims. 33 Higher salaries 134 for public defenders would
125 Id. 364 (Poole, J., dissenting).
126 See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
'
27 For a discussion of when a state will not elect to foster finality, see infra
notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
128The Noia reign was known to have exerted indirect pressure on states to
reform their own post-conviction remedies in an effort to reduce the number of
cases diverted to federal courts on habeas. See Meador, The Impact of Federal
Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 52 VA. L. REv. 286, 297-98 (1966) ("If
Noia and Townsend remain unimpaired they might similarly influence a nationwide
reform in state criminal trial procedures .... ).
129 See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
130 See supra text accompanying note 105.
131 See supra text accompanying note 106.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
133 See supra note 102.
134 Salaries for government attorneys are traditionally far lower than those avail-
able to new associates at large law firms. In 1980, for example, a law school
graduate joining one New York City firm earned $39,981. If the same graduate
joined the New York County District Attorney's Office, the graduate would earn
$18-20,000. Questionnaires Filed through the National Association of Law Place-
ment Offices. The latter figure is probably comparable to the pay of public de-
(Vol. 130:981
attract more talented 1' young lawyers to public defender's offices
and encourage them to stay,'3 6 increasing the experience of the
public defender's staff.
Other options available to the state would decrease the num-
ber of procedural defaults by private as well as public attorneys.
The state designs its own procedural rules; simplification of those
rules would decrease the number of constitutional claims an at-
torney defaults out of ignorance of the proper procedure.1
3 7
States also control admission to practice; they can use that power
to increase the competency required before admission or to impose
continuing education requirements on the criminal bar to ensure
familiarity with recent legal developments. 138 The educational
effort could range from requirements of recertification to publica-
tion of a periodic newsletter canvassing pertinent new case law.
A similar end could be achieved by alerting judges to recent legal
developments and charging them to remind counsel of potential
constitutional challenges that are about to be defaulted; 19 the
fenders; in general, salaries offered in both offices are competitive with each other.
See Wice & Suwak, supra note 103, at 166.
135 See supra text following note 114.
136 The lure of more money in the private sector may lead attorneys to leave
government service just as they are gaining the experience to function most effec-
tively. For example, only three percent of the attorneys at the New York County
District Attorney's Office have been there more than ten years, 21% for more than
five years, and 65% for more than two years. See Questionnaire, supra note 134.
137 See supra text following note 101.
138 Some question exists, however, whether continuing legal education alleviates
ineffective representation. Judge Bazelon suggests that "neither specialization nor
continuing [legal] education is addressed to the problems of indifference and over-
work, yet . . . these are the most frequent causes of the ineffective representation
many indigent defendants receive." Bazelon, supra note 102, at 818 (footnote
omitted). Another commentator postulated that continuing legal education will not
"meet the challenges of advancing the competency" of attorneys. Wolkin, A Better
Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A. J. 574, 575 (1975). Wolkin went on
to say that "mere attendance at continuing legal education courses will not neces-
sarily enhance competence. Presence is not evidence of learning .... [Tihe num-
ber of hours being prescribed is so minimal that it is difficult to perceive any long-
lasting benefits related to enhancing competence." Id. 575-76. Wolkin recommended
a system that would include selective monitoring of competence, voluntary peer
review, and effective voluntary continuing legal education. Wolkin, More on a
Better Way to Keep Lawyers Competent, 61 A.B.A. J. 1064 (1975). Not all
authorities are as pessimistic about the value of mandatory legal education pro-
grams. The Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, for example, advocated a
mandatory program of study (either in law school or as continuing legal education)
as a prerequisite for practicing in district court. Each lawyer would be required
to take courses in evidence, civil procedure, criminal law and procedure, professional
responsibility, and trial advocacy. These recommendations-the Clare Committee
Report-were summarized in New Admission Rules Proposed for Federal District
Courts, 61 A.B.A. J. 945 (1975).
139 See Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court,
126 U. PA. L. REy. 473, 510-11, 514 (1978). By finding no fault with the trial
judge's failure to raise an objection to admission of the statement in Sykes, 433
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states could even develop a checklist to be reviewed in court before
trial to remind counsel of potential constitutional objections.' 10
Finally, one commentator has suggested that state courts can in-
crease finality by making a complete record for the reviewing
habeas court.141 Under a system that allows review for uninten-
tional defaults, for example, a complete record can make clear that
a default was in fact intentional.
After a procedural default occurs, the state may guard its
finality interest in a prospective manner. By notifying the at-
torney who committed the procedural default, the state decreases
the likelihood that the attorney will default similar claims in the
future; inveterate defaulters 142 could be threatened with disbar-
ment and ultimately be disbarred, a move certain to decrease the
number of inveterate defaulters practicing in the state.
The state thus has at its command numerous tools for promot-
ing its own finality interest. When habeas review is available for
all unintentionally defaulted claims, the rational state's decision
as to how to promote that interest is analogous to the manufac-
turer's decision about how to increase worker safety under a
regimen of strict liability for accidents in the workplace. Manu-
facturers do not provide their employees with the safest equipment
imaginable. Instead, the manufacturers determine whether it is
cheaper for them to pay damages when workers are injured or to
reduce the outlay for damages by spending money to obtain safer
equipment. 43  Economically rational manufacturers take the
course that decreases their total costs; 144 that course, however,
may not be the one that decreases accidents.
145
U.S. at 91, the Court suggests that there might be occasions when the trial judge's
failure to object sua sponte might make the cause-and-prejudice test inapplicable.
An affirmative role for the judge was also advanced in Meador, supra note 128, at
293 (1966). "[Bly developing certain new behavior patterns the trial judge can
increase substantially the probability of finality."
140 Cf. Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84
HAv. L. REv. 1, 23 (1970) (urging judges to ask defendants a list of questions
before accepting their guilty pleas), quoted in Spritzer, supra note 139, at 495
n.114.
'4'Meador, supra note 128, at 291-92 (1966); see also Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963) (habeas court may direct a new evidentiary hearing).
142 Frequent defaulters may violate rules requiring diligent investigation of the
legal and factual bases of potential constitutional claims. See, e.g., ABA S-rArNDARs,
supra note 41, §§4.1, at 225-26 (duty to investigate facts), 5.1(a), at 234 (duty
to advise defendant after fully informing himself on the facts and the law).
143 If safer equipment cost manufacturers no more, of course, they would use it.
144 The manufacturers' total cost equals the cost of their equipment plus the
damages they must pay for injuries to their workers.
145 See G. CALABnsr, THE CosTs OF AccmENTs 18 (1970) (Manufacturers
"use relatively safe equipment rather than the safest imaginable because-and it is
not a bad reason-the safest costs too much.").
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In a similar fashion, states in a system that allows habeas re-
view of procedurally defaulted claims will not attempt simply to
increase finality: the state has other goals to consider, such as "re-
ducing erroneous judicial decisions" 146 and minimizing the cost
of its justice system.
Before using one of its tools to decrease procedural defaults,
therefore, the state will balance the cost of using the method
against the resulting benefits of increased finality. If the cost is
less than the total benefit, the state should use the tool to reduce
procedural defaults. If, however, the use of a certain tool costs
more than refraining from its use, the state may find the cost asso-
ciated with decreasing the mistrials prohibitive. What results is a
compromise; neither goal is maximized, but each is pursued to a
limited degree.
The state is in the best position to balance the goals. First,
the state is the party that bears the cost of retrial; it is therefore
best able to calculate the cost associated with decreased finality.
Second, because the state always knows when a habeas petition has
been granted to a state prisoner, it is in the best position to de-
termine whether any of its attempts to decrease procedural de-
faults has indeed increased finality; if ineffective, the programs
may be modified or eliminated. Third, the state is best able to
calculate the cost associated with any given reform: 147 for example,
the cost of running continuing education programs, the cost of
freeing attorneys to attend the sessions, and even the cost to the
state of having to process additional constitutional claims at the
trial level.14  The state has greater access to all this information
than do federal courts.
1.46 On the other hand, the state will not be able to reduce the error rate to
zero because of the costs which would be associated with such a procedural system.
See B. PoSNER, ECONOMIC ANxLysIs OF LAw 429 (2d ed. 1977). Similarly, the
state may not be able to increase finality to the greatest extent possible because of
prohibitive costs.
147The costs may be difficult to ascertain. For example, although increasing
the number of claims that private attorneys must raise would have no direct effect
on the state in terms of the cost of providing defense, the sanctions necessary to
enforce such a program would decrease the pool of private defense attorneys and
thereby increase the cost of private criminal counsel That would result in a higher
percentage of defendants being unable to retain private counsel, increasing the
number of persons that the state will be required to defend. An increase in the
cost of private counsel would also necessitate proportionally higher rates of com-
pensation to private attorneys retained to defend indigent clients; otherwise, those
attorneys would be disinclined to investigate cases fully because they are paid at
a higher rate in their private capacity.
14s This cost is increased to the extent that a reform generates a high ratio of
fruitless to fruitful claims.
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III. THE CASE FOR FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW OF
UNINTENTIONALLY DEFAULTED CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Wainwright v. Sykes 149 makes clear that federal district courts
are not to entertain habeas petitions from petitioners whose at-
torneys were "sandbagging"-that is, committing deliberate by-
passes of state procedures for raising the federal constitutional
claim.150 It also makes clear that the burden of proving "cause and
prejudice" falls on the petitioner. 151 What remains to be decided
is the extent to which unintentional bypasses should bar habeas
review.152 This Comment proposes that the "cause" prong of
Sykes be considered satisfied whenever a petitioner shows that a
procedural default is unintentional. 53 A contrary approach re-
moves incentives to the states to decrease procedural defaults. It
also increases the need for federal courts to process claims of inef-
fective assistance, thereby placing the responsibility for shaping
legal delivery systems on a party not well suited to designing the
most effective system. 54
149433 U.S. 72 (1977).
150 Deliberate bypasses barred habeas review even under the Noia rule, see
supra text accompanying notes, and the Sykes test is "narrower" than the Noia
test, see supra note 35 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 23-36 and
accompanying text.
151 In Sykes, the Court held only that the cause prong of the threshold test
was not met when petitioner failed to explain why the constitutional claim was
bypassed. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Therefore, Sykes establishes
that the initial burden is on the petitioner, not the state, to explain why the pro-
cedurally defaulted claim was not raised. See also Sykes, 433 U.S. at 99 (White,
J., concurring in the judgment) (burden on petitioner).
152 One commentator has urged that the Court adopt a "reasonableness" stand-
ard-that is, that habeas review be permitted whenever an attorney unreasonably
commits a procedural default of a federal constitutional claim. "The reasonableness
standard . . . would . . . focus on the specific error committed by the petitioner's
counsel. The test would be whether, in light of the specific circumstances sur-
rounding the single act of nonobjection, the attorney acted reasonably." Note,
Attorney Error as "Cause" under Wainwright v. Sykes: The Case for a Reasonable-
ness Standard after Washington v. Downes, 67 VA. L. RPv. 415, 427 (1981).
Because a procedural default can be unintentional but nonetheless reasonable, how-
ever, see supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text, the reasonableness test would
eliminate habeas review for some unintentionally procedural defaults.
153 The Virginia note does not discuss the possibility of defining "cause" in
such terms; it presumes that the only alternative to a "reasonableness" test is an
"ineffectiveness" test. See generally Note, supra note 152. The "unintentional
default" standard proposed here would apply whether the default was reasonable
or not.
154 In an effort to protect the constitutional rights of prisoners, federal courts
may recognize such claims. The ineffectiveness of counsel "bypass" is unsatisfac-
tory, however, in a number of ways. For example, the defendant, the party in the
worst position to choose efficient solutions to the procedural default problem, would
bear the burden of promoting litigation of constitutional claims. Experimentation
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A. The Problems with Promoting Finality of State Convictions
by Denying Habeas Review of Certain Procedurally
Defaulted Claims
Promoting the state's finality interest by denying habeas re-
view of some unintentionally defaulted claims is inferior to pro-
viding habeas review for all unintentionally bypassed claims and
leaving the state to determine how to protect its finality interest.155
Each of the parties involved-the state, the attorney, the prisoner,
and the federal courts-is unfavorably affected by a system in which
finality is maximized by denying habeas review of some uninten-
tionally defaulted claims.
1. Effects on the State
When habeas review is unavailable for procedurally defaulted
claims, the state loses its incentive to increase the quality of the
criminal bar or otherwise decrease procedural default because the
state's finality interest largely would be satisfied. The state would
derive no further benefit of increased finality from the expendi-
tures necessary to decrease defaults.156 With less incentive, the
state is not encouraged to use its control over procedural defaults 157
to decrease those defaults. More procedural defaults lessen the
workload of the state courts by decreasing the substantive claims
they process. Public attorneys could also handle more cases. The
state thus will not do all it could to reduce procedural defaults if
habeas review is unavailable.
2. Effects on the Attorney
The elimination of habeas review authorized by Wainwright
v. Sykes was aimed largely at deterring defense counsel from "sand-
bagging." 158 Because sandbagging is predicated on the existence
of habeas review for the procedurally defaulted claim, 59 elimi-
in how best to deliver legal services would be discouraged, and use of the ineffec-
tiveness claim would skew the definition of ineffectiveness and increase state-federal
friction.
155 See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
156 The state will pay the cost necessary to decrease procedural defaults when
that cost is less than the benefit that would accrue to the state if defaults decrease.
See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text. Costs, of course, may be social as
well as economic.
15 7 See supra notes 127-42 and accompanying text.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 23-38.
159 By definition, sandbagging occurs only when defense counsel is saving the
claim for a possible habeas challenge. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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nating habeas review of deliberately defaulted claims would elim-
inate the possibility of sandbagging.
Eliminating habeas review of unintentionally defaulted claims,
on the other hand, is not likely to decrease materially the number
of defaults an attorney commits. This failure is not explained
simply by saying that unintentional defaults cannot be deterred; 160
indeed, attorneys probably can decrease the number of defaults some-
what. Analysis of why procedural defaults occur 1 " suggests that
individual attorneys could eliminate at least some of them. For
example, if an attorney could work longer hours without ceasing
to be effective, the attorney could avoid those defaults caused by
spending too little time per case: 162 the attorney could simply
put in more time. Attorneys could likewise avoid those defaults
caused by lack of knowledge of recent legal developments by under-
taking self-imposed continuing education regimens, such as reading
professional journals or attending seminars.
16
3
Attorneys, however, may not take such steps to decrease pro-
cedural defaults. Each step carries a cost to the attorney: it re-
duces the time available for other activities, whether professional
or personal, and may carry other, more tangible costs, such
as seminar enrollment fees. The attorney may decide to pay that
cost only if it is less than the corresponding benefit. 164  The poten-
tial inability to obtain habeas review of a defaulted claim is there-
fore unlikely to stir the attorney to undertake the cost of avoiding
default; not only is the brunt of the penalty for procedural de-
fault absorbed by the client, but the attorney, who no doubt will
assert some defense for his client, may believe that pressing addi-
tional claims rarely will be fruitful.165
1
6 0 But see Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 415-16: "[Tlhe sandbagging rationale
is inapplicable to attorneys who commit defaults as a result of negligence or
ignorance. These lawyers cannot possibly be deterred by the imposition of a for-
feiture against their clients." See also The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 Hnv.
L. REv. 70, 217-18 (1977) ("There is good reason to believe that sandbagging is
not often a useful tactic, and that in any event federal courts are sufficiently able
to deter it. The most likely explanation for procedural defaults, then, is attorney
error.") (footnotes omitted); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 113 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Punishing a lawyer's unintentional errors by closing the federal court-
house door to his client is both a senseless and misdirected method of deterring
the slighting of state rules .... [unplanned and unintentional action of any kind
generally is not subject to deterrence .. ").
161 See supra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
162 See id.
163 But see supra note 138.
164The attorney's decision is analogous to the state's discussed supra notes
143-48 and accompanying text.
165 Although the approach of denying review of unintentional defaults may not
alter attorney conduct, the state, because of its superior power over the attorney,
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3. Effects on the Prisoner
If all claims lost through unintentional procedural default were
cognizable on habeas, the cost of imperfections in the mechanism
for preserving valid constitutional claims would be borne by the
state in the form of retrial costs. The state would spread those
costs across society by taxation. Under the restrictive-review ap-
proach, however, the costs of default fall on those prisoners whose
attorneys failed to raise the valid claim. Because a client's factual
guilt is not related to whether his attorney commits procedural
defaults,06 even prisoners whose defaulted claims are guilt-related
must bear the cost, namely incarceration, when a good chance exists
that absent the default they would have not have been found guilty.
Considering the Court's view of habeas as most valuable when
protecting the innocent from unconstitutional incarceration,
167
such a result would be curious at best.
4. Effects on the Federal Courts
Federal courts, 68 if concerned about preserving constitutional
rights, may believe it necessary to interfere in a system in which
unintentional defaults fail to satisfy the "cause" requirement. To
could persuade attorneys to take steps to avoid default by increasing the penalty
for defaulting. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
166 Indeed, an attorney who fails to raise a claim because of his belief in the
guilt of his client has provided ineffective assistance. "The lawyer, who refuses
his professional assistance because in his judgment the case is unjust and indefen-
sible, usurps the function of both judge and jury." G. SELAMSwooD, PRoFEssroNAL
Ewmcs, reprinted in 32 A.B.A. Rsa,. 33-84 (1907). See also ABA STANDARas, supra
note 41, § 4.1, at 226 (lawyer under duty to investigate "regardless of the accused's
admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt").
167 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491-92 n.31 (1976):
"We . . . afford broad habeas corpus relief, recognizing the need in
a free society for an additional safeguard against compelling an innocent
man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty. The Court in Fay v.
Noia described habeas corpus as a remedy for "whatever society deems to
be intolerable restraints," and recognized that those to whom the writ
should be granted "are persons whom society has grievously wronged."
But in the case of a typical Fourth Amendment claim, asserted on col-
lateral attack, a convicted defendant is usually asking society to redeter-
mine an issue that has no bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration.
(Emphasis added; citations omitted.)
Whether the innocent-man view of habeas corpus comports with the historical
role of the writ has been the subject of controversy. See, e.g., Hart, The Supreme
Court, 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart of the justices, 73 Hsv. L. REv.
84, 103-04 (1959); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64
MICE L. REv. 451 (1966).
16 8This assumes that the federal courts would perceive and respond to the
problem more quickly than Congress, which could always reinstate habeas review
for procedurally defaulted claims.
19821
1008 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
preserve the federal interest in protecting federal constitutional
rights from procedural default, the courts may place greater em-
phasis on the sixth amendment. Such emphasis may create more
problems than it would solve.
B. The Problems with Using the Ineffectiveness Doctrine to
Preserve Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court has failed to give content to the sixth
amendment's requirement of effective assistance of counsel; ",,
reliance on sixth amendment doctrine to safeguard constitutional
rights in the absence of effective habeas review would be uneven
without Supreme Court guidance. Using that doctrine in place
of habeas review for procedurally defaulted claims also could dam-
age the attorney-client relationship; the attorney would enter every
professional relationship knowing that any procedural default
could result in a claim of ineffectiveness. 70 Further, creating
constitutional doctrine to protect constitutional claims from de-
fault would hamper experimentation with novel approaches to
delivering legal services. 17'
Doctrinal problems aside, federal courts could use ineffective-
ness findings to protect constitutional rights from procedural de-
fault in two ways. Each is less desirable than the habeas tool.
1. The Shell Game
Courts could say that counsel had provided ineffective as-
sistance whenever they default a valid constitutional claim. The
169 See Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011, 1011-12 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari and accusing the Court of failing in its "respon-
sibility to determine what level of competence satisfies the constitutional impera-
tive."); Strazzella, supra note 64, at 484.
Commentators have not been as quiet. See, e.g., Bazelon, The Defective
Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CiN. L. REv. 1 (1973); Bines, Remedying Ineffective
Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv.
927 (1973); Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 ComNEr. L. Rxv. 1077
(1973); Stone, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Post-Conviction Relief in
Criminal Cases: Changing Standards and Practical Consequences, Cotrms. Hum.
RTs. L. REV. 427 (1975); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. RPv. 289 (1964);
Note, Indigents" Dissatisfaction with Assigned Counsel, 22 CrLzv. ST. L. REv. 157
(1973); Comment, Incompetency of Counsel, 25 BAyLoR L. REV. 299 (1973);
Note, supra note 52.
170 See Tague, supra note 10, at 66.
171 The Virginia note, supra note 152, points to two further weaknesses in the
use of the sixth amendment claim: "First, it may be unduly harsh on defendants
whose cases are prejudiced by attorney error that falls short of being constitutionally
deficient" Second, "requiring a defendant to prove full ineffective assistance of
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effect of such an approach is the same on both prisoners and states
as use of the habeas tool: whenever a prisoner's valid constitu-
tional claim had been defaulted, the prisoner would receive a
new trial. Because the state's finality interest would be affected by
procedural defaults of valid constitutional claims, the state would
attempt to decrease procedural defaults through the various mech-
anisms under its control. 172 The effect on the state would thus
be similar to allowing habeas review of all unintentional pro-
cedural defaults. This approach is inferior to use of direct ha-
beas review, however, because it would increase strain on the
attorney-client relationship."73
2. Selective Ineffectiveness
Rather than branding as ineffective the assistance of any at-
torney who defaults a valid constitutional claim, the courts are
likely to find that some unintentional defaults do not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. By so doing, the courts will pro-
mote only the finality of state convictions that rest on procedural
defaults of certain kinds-the ones that the courts believe even
effective counsel could default. This limited increase in state
finality comes, however, at the expense of certain state prisoners
who must bear the cost of a system that allows the other kinds of
procedural defaults.174 The costs fall randomly according to at-
torney conduct.
counsel forces him into the anomalous position of having to prove two constitutional
violations in order to receive the remedy for a single violation." Id. 425.
172 See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
173 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text. But some urge that this
need not be unfair if habeas review is granted for defaulted claims that are guilt-
related. See cases cited supra note 55.
One commentator has criticized the guilt-related approach to habeas review as
redundant, arguing that the state's interest in incarcerating the guilty is sufficiently
high to ensure protection of those rights because of (1) public outrage over an
erroneous outcome, (2) the cost of supporting unjustly incarcerated prisoners, and
(3) the danger to society of letting the true criminal go free. See Note, Guilt,
Innocence, and Federalism in Habeas Corpus, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1123, 1142-43
(1980). Such a review ignores the actual pressures on the state when a crime is
committed. Public outrage runs highest not when the convicted person claims
innocence, but when a crime goes unpunished; thus, the state is pressured not to
discern the truth-a quality that the pressuring public is not in a good position to
evaluate-but to attain conviction. The second factor-the cost of supporting
unjustly incarcerated prisoners-would have force only if the state perceived that
it costs more to incarcerate innocent persons than guilty ones. Finally, the public's
fear that the real criminal remains free to terrorize society is an active force only
in the unusual circumstance when the public actually perceives that the person
convicted was not guilty. It seems unlikely that most members of the public ever
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The courts could take a selective ineffectiveness approach in
three ways. First, they could enunciate a standard, such as rea-
sonableness, 175 against which procedural defaults would be judged;
if the default is unreasonable, then the attorney has provided in-
effective assistance. Second, a court could identify "special" rights,
default of which would always constitute ineffectiveness; for ex-
ample, the court could say that default of a valid fourth amend-
ment claim always constitutes ineffectiveness in a case in which the
prosecution introduces the fruits of a warrantless search. Third,
the courts could protect constitutional rights against default by
requiring the states to employ certain of the tools at the state's
command to decrease the incidence of procedural defaults.
Each of the approaches is inferior to allowing habeas review
of unintentionally defaulted claims. Using a "reasonableness"
standard (or its equivalent) defines ineffectiveness in terms of
normal attorney conduct with respect to procedural defaults. By
defining ineffectiveness in such terms, the courts do not encourage
the states to decrease procedural bypasses-and thus the standard
may be eroded by the decreasing competence of area counsel. The
standard is thus subject to variations that could result in shifting
standards of justice for petitioners.
Additionally, the reasonableness approach removes the state's
incentive to decrease defaults not deemed to constitute ineffective-
ness. By disallowing review for errors committed by attorney
conduct that was "reasonable," a reasonableness rule would dis-
courage the state from using its own tools to increase finality.176
In effect, the federal courts have done the state's work for it. The
states could ignore defaults in public defenders offices, for example,
and combine increased workloads 177 with draconian sanctions ,78
become sufficiently familiar with the entire case against an accused to make a
knowledgable judgment of guilt or innocence. That the accused has been publicly
accused probably creates a heavy presumption of guilt in the public's mind, espe-
cially when the accused has a prior record. For a more persuasive argument
against expansion of the guilt-related approach to habeas review, see Schulhofer,
Confessions and the Court (Book Review), 79 MrcH. L. REv. 865, 888-91 (1981)
(reviewing Y. KAMZISA, POLcE INTEMROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW
AND PorCY (1980)) (expansion of Stone v. Powell approach in context of con-
fessions would not increase efficiency of judiciary).
175 This should not be confused with the position taken by the Virginia note,
supra note 152. That note suggests that the Sykes "cause" requirement be con-
sidered satisfied whenever an attorney's default is unreasonable. See supra note
152 and accompanying text. Selective ineffectiveness has no relation to "cause"-
it operates under the sixth amendment.
17 6 See supra notes 127-42 and accompanying text.
17 7 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
' 78 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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for committing reviewable procedural defaults, effectively de-
termining those areas on which the attorney will concentrate. As
long as the resulting errors were reasonable, the state has lost no
finality-habeas review will be denied-and the state has no incen-
tives to decrease procedural defaults.
The second selective approach is likewise flawed. Singling
out "special" rights, the default of which may trigger an ineffec-
tiveness claim, also discourages the state from using the means
available to it to decrease certain procedural defaults. The state
simply will rely on federal courts to deny claims not involving
these "special" rights. Further, because of the state's economic
incentive not to discourage unreviewable procedural defaults,
more of these defaults may occur, and the federal courts could
find themselves in the anomalous position of paying the least at-
tention to those claims most likely to be defaulted. If the state
is better able to control public rather than private attorneys, more
unreviewable defaults may occur in the state-run system, widening
the gap between the quality of legal services accorded the poor
and the rich.
The third way for the federal courts to institute a selective
ineffectiveness approach, requiring states to use administrative
tools to decrease defaults, 79 like the other two approaches, encour-
ages states to increase procedural defaults of certain, unreviewable
claims. 80 Because compliance with the federal courts' require-
ments would insulate defaults from review, a state need not use
any other tool at its disposal to decrease defaults. Those defaults
not under federal protection would go unremedied.
Besides damaging the attorney-client relationship-a fault com-
mon to all versions of ineffectiveness doctrine 's-the third ap-
proach is also flawed because it would place the burden of im-
proving legal delivery systems on the federal courts. Because those
courts arguably are in a worse position than the states to analyze
the costs and benefits of potential reforms to the delivery system, 82
federally mandated legal delivery systems are more likely to be
inefficient than are those that states would adopt if all uninten-
179 This approach does avoid one problem plaguing the reasonableness standard
approach: it does not involve standards that define ineffectiveness in terms of
normal attorney conduct. The state, therefore, having no hope of altering the
standard, also has no incentive to increase procedural defaults in general.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 177-78.
181 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
3
82 See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
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tionally bypassed claims were cognizable on habeas. Because the
court-mandated legal innovations would be based on sixth amend-
ment constitutional doctrine, federal courts would be less able to
take a trial-and-error approach to legal reform than would the
states. Furthermore, extensive inquiry by federal courts into the
states' legal delivery systems would heighten state-federal friction.
83
C. The Superiority of Defining "Cause" to Include All
Unintentional Defaults
Although Wainwright v. Sykes has been highly criticized, it
is the current law of the land. The opinion, though often per-
ceived as harsh, does express legitimate concerns-namely, curbing
deliberate use of habeas corpus to bypass the state courts and pro-
moting the state's right to protect its system of orderly adminis-
tration.
To work within the Sykes framework, therefore, is to properly
balance the finality and administrative concerns against the con-
cerns that defendants get a fair trial with competent attorneys,
that procedural defaults are minimized, and that defendants' con-
stitutional claims are thus protected. Allowing habeas review of
all unintentionally defaulted claims provides the best solution to
this balancing problem.
The state's concern that its procedural rules not be deliber-
ately flouted will be safeguarded because a deliberate default, of
course, would not be unintentional, and therefore would be un-
reviewable. As to these claims, finality is assured, as is orderly
state procedure.
Allowing habeas review of unintentionally defaulted claims
differs from the deliberate bypass test of Fay v. Noia 184 in two
important respects. First, under the test proposed here the peti-
tioner must show prejudice arising from the procedural default.
Second, the petitioner would be required to prove the default was
not deliberate to obtain review. Placing the burden of proving
cause on the petitioner comports with the American Bar Associa-
tion's recommendation that attorneys fully discuss strategy with
183 See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1083 (1977) (although cutbacks in habeas jurisdiction
might initially decrease state-federal friction, subsequent use of the sixth amendment
to promote federal aims could cause state-federal friction to return "with a
vengeance.").
184372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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their clients.5 5 More importantly, and in contrast with Noia,8 8
the state clearly would not have the burden of proving deliberate
by-pass and thus would not be strapped by an inadequate record
or by the passage of time.
The state is in the best position to ensure that attorneys dis-
cuss potential claims with their clients, just as it is in the best
position to prevent procedural defaults from occurring. A system
allowing habeas review for unintentionally defaulted claims will
give the state an economic incentive-the loss of finality, and the
costs incurred from habeas review-to use its tools to decrease pro-
cedural defaults. The federal courts thus can let the states decide
how best to ensure competent trial systems, and need not interfere
if the states are successful.
Finally, allowing habeas review of unintentionally defaulted
claims is superior to reliance on sixth amendment ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims. Habeas review for unintentional de-
faults is less of a direct attack on the attorney; the attorney-client
relationship is therefore less vulnerable. No variable standard,
such as reasonableness, can be eroded because all unintentional
defaults, whether reasonable or not, can be reviewed. The state's
incentive to decrease procedural defaults remains intact, and the
federal courts are not in the position of imposing their own ideas
of effective legal delivery systems on the states.
IV. CONCLUSION
The failure of the federal courts of appeals to develop a co-
herent approach to the availability of habeas review of uninten-
tionally defaulted claims can be traced to the Supreme Court's
inaccurate assumption in Wainwright v. Sykes18 7 that attorneys
almost always act deliberately. Because that assumption has pre-
vented the courts from perceiving why procedural defaults actually
1
8 5 See ABA STADAmDS, supra note 41, §§ 5.1, at 234-35, 5.2, at 237-38
("[T]he lawyer should advise the accused with complete candor concerning all
aspects of the case, including his candid estimate of the probable outcome.")
(§5.2(b) states that although certain decisions are the attorney's, they should be
made "after consultation with his client." Id. 238). Chief Justice Burger has sug-
gested that the spur-of-the-moment nature of criminal trials makes it impossible for
attorneys to consult with clients before making trial decisions. See Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 93 (Burger, C.J., concurring). But proper preparation of a case
should enable an attorney to anticipate nearly any constitutional claim that might
arise and to consult with a client before trial in the unlikely event that the attorney
thinks that the client's case would be furthered by failing to raise the claim. See
supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
186 See supra note 22.
1s7433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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occur, the courts have not considered the extent to which states
can control the incidence of procedural default. Analysis of the
ways states behave when unintentional defaults are directly
cognizable, as well as the consequences of denying habeas review
for any or all unintentionally defaulted claims, suggests that the
federal courts should define "cause" under Sykes such that all un.
intentionally defaulted claims will be directly cognizable on ha-
beas. By promoting efficient means for delivery of legal services,
such an approach best balances the state's interest in finality and
the federal government's interest in protecting constitutional claims
from unintentional procedural default.
